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We examine the role of deferred vesting of stock and option grants in reducing 
executive turnover. To the extent an executive forfeits all unvested stock and option 
grants if she leaves the firm, deferred vesting will increase the cost (to the executive) of 
early exit. Using pay Duration proposed in Gopalan, et al., (forthcoming) as a measure 
of the length of managerial pay, we find that CEOs and non-CEO executives with 
longer pay Duration are less likely to leave the firm voluntarily. Employing the vesting 
of a large prior-year stock/option grant as an instrument for Duration, we find the effect 
to be causal. CEOs with longer pay Duration are also less likely to experience a forced 
turnover and the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance is significantly 
lower in firms that offer longer duration pay. Overall, our study highlights a strong link 
between compensation design and turnover for top executives. 
 
JEL classification: G30, G34 










      Retaining and motivating talented executives is a key ingredient for firms to create 
shareholder value. This is especially the case for human capital-intensive firms where 
value creation requires executives to acquire and develop firm-specific knowledge. 
Frequent turnover among executives will not only result in loss of valuable firm-specific 
knowledge but will also affect the incentives of the executive to acquire the knowledge 
in the first place. Understanding this, in practice, firms use a number of implicit and 
explicit contractual features to retain talented executives. The recent controversy about 
information technology firms colluding in their hiring practices to limit poaching talent 
from each other highlights the extent to which firms are willing to go to retain talent.1 
Chief among the explicit (and legal!) contractual provisions employed by firms to retain 
talent is deferred pay. To the extent an executive forfeits all deferred pay if she leaves 
the firm, deferring pay will increase the cost (to the executive) of early exit.  
      Despite its importance, the effectiveness of deferred pay in helping firms retain 
talent has received limited research attention. This is mainly because of lack of data on 
the extent of deferred pay. In this paper, we use information on the vesting provisions 
of stock and option grants for a sample of S&P 1500 firms to study the role of deferred 
stock and option grants (deferred pay from now on) in executive turnover. Our analysis 
also helps us understand the importance of executive talent and firm-specific 
knowledge for both the design of deferred pay and executive turnover.  
                                                          
1 See Wall Street Journal articles titled “Ebay settles recruiting allegations” dated May 1, 2014 and “Tech 
companies agree to settle wage suit” dated April 24, 2014. 
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      Specifically, we study the effectiveness of deferred pay in helping firms retain the 
top five highest paid executives of the firm. We focus on the top five executives because 
of availability of detailed data on deferred pay and also because the highest paid 
executives are likely to be among the most valuable employees of the firm and their 
retention should be of utmost importance to the firm.  
      A typical compensation package for a top executive includes both a cash (salary and 
bonus) and a stock component (restricted stock and stock options). Firms typically defer 
the stock component of pay. Every stock and option grant is associated with a vesting 
schedule and the manager is not allowed to exercise or sell (or hedge) the grant until it 
vests. A manager who voluntarily or involuntarily leaves the firm typically forfeits all 
the unvested grants. The retention incentives provided by a stock or option grant 
depends both on the size of the grant and the length of the remaining vesting schedule. 
All else equal, a larger grant and one with a longer vesting schedule will provide 
greater retention incentives. To capture these twin effects, we employ the measure of 
executive pay duration (Duration), introduced by Gopalan et. al., (forthcoming), to 
quantify the extent of long-term retention incentives provided by an incentive contract. 
Duration is the weighted average of the vesting periods of all four components of pay 
(salary, bonus, restricted stock, and stock options), with each component’s weight being 
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the fraction of that component in the executive’s total compensation.2 In our empirical 
analysis, we estimate the effect of Duration on the probability of an executive turnover.3 
      We begin our empirical analysis by estimating the relation between pay Duration 
and the likelihood of voluntary executive turnover. We classify a CEO turnover as 
involuntary following the criteria in Parrino (1997) complemented by two of our own. 
We reclassify an involuntary turnover according to Parrino (1997) as voluntary if the 
CEO’s employment record, obtained from Boardex and Marquis Who’s Who 
publications, suggests that the CEO takes a comparable position elsewhere, or if the 
press reports announcing the turnover convincingly explain that the departure is due to 
previously undisclosed personal or business reason that is unrelated to the firm’s 
activities. All the CEO turnovers not classified as forced or due to mandatory or 
planned retirements are classified as voluntary. We identify turnover of other senior 
executives using ExecuComp and BoardEx. We classify a non-CEO senior executive 
turnover as voluntary if it is not due to retirement, health reasons and if we are able to 
identify the executive’s new employment from ExecuComp or BoardEx. We call such 
voluntary turnovers as executives “jumping ship”. 
      We expect a longer pay Duration to reduce the likelihood of a voluntary turnover 
because any outside opportunity should be sufficiently valuable to the executive so as 
                                                          
2 The vesting periods of cash and bonus are zero, and thus the magnitude of the calculated pay duration 
depends on the vesting periods of stock options and restricted stocks, and their relative weights in the 
total compensation.  
3 In constructing Duration, we do not include any vesting provisions embedded in the pension provisions 
of the firm. To this extent, Duration may be a noisy measure of the extent of deferred pay. We discuss this 
further in Section 3.2. 
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to compensate for the lost unvested pay. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that 
senior executives with longer pay Duration are less likely to voluntarily leave the firm. 
This is true both for CEOs and for other senior executives. The effects we document are 
economically very large. We find that a one standard deviation increase in Duration (an 
increase by 0.97 years) is associated with a 58% decrease in the likelihood of a voluntary 
CEO turnover in a given year. For other senior executives, we find that a one standard 
deviation increase in Duration (an increase by 0.88 years) is associated with a 150% 
reduction in the probability of an executive jumping ship. We find that the link between 
pay duration and executive turnover becomes stronger when we complement our 
measure of pay duration by including unvested stock and option grants from prior 
years (Duration-2). 
      A negative correlation between Duration (or Duration-2) and voluntary executive 
turnover may not imply a causal effect of deferred pay on turnover. Firm-level and 
executive-level omitted variables can bias the coefficient. The important firm-level 
omitted variable that may affect both Duration and the likelihood of executive turnover 
is the importance of firm-specific knowledge. All else equal, in situations where firm-
specific knowledge is more important, firms are likely to offer longer Duration pay and 
executives of such firms may also remain longer with the firm because of the difficulty 
of applying their (firm-specific) knowledge elsewhere. The important executive-level 
omitted variable is executive talent. All else equal, executives perceived to be more 
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talented by the board will obtain longer duration pay and such executives may also 
remain longer with the firm, given their favorable internal perception.4 
      To overcome this endogeneity issue, we implement an IV regression where we 
instrument for Duration-2. Our instrument identifies years in which a large prior-year 
stock or option grant vests (Large vesting) so that the executive’s overall pay duration 
decreases. To ensure our instrument is truly exogenous, we focus on grants that were 
granted more than two years prior. A similar instrument is used by Edmans, Fang and 
Lewellen (2014) to study the effect of stock vesting schedules on managerial myopia. 
We use these vesting episodes as instances that shock pay duration and estimate its 
effect on executive turnover. To the extent that these grants were awarded in the distant 
past, their vesting is unlikely to be correlated with (time-varying) firm and executive-
level omitted variables. In the IV specification, we control for all time invariant firm-
specific factors by including firm fixed effects. Our IV results corroborate our OLS 
estimates and indicate a causal effect of Duration on executive turnover. We find our IV 
estimates to be larger than the OLS estimates. The relationship between stock and 
option vesting and executive turnover that we uncover may also help explain why such 
episodes are associated with managerial myopia (Edmans, Fang, and Lewellen 2014).  
      In our next set of tests, we estimate the effect of pay duration on the likelihood of 
involuntary executive turnover. To the extent that the decision to remove a CEO is 
                                                          
4 Since neither firm-specific knowledge nor executive talent is observable, we implicitly use these terms as 
a catch-all for all firm-specific and executive-specific factors that may both increase pay duration and 
decrease the likelihood of a voluntary turnover. 
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taken by the board in the shareholders’ best interest, one does not expect a causal 
relationship between Duration and the likelihood of forced turnover. The board should 
not be concerned with the executive losing (or not losing) her unvested stock/option 
grants when deciding to remove her. On the other hand, there are three non-mutually 
exclusive reasons why Duration and forced executive turnover may be negatively 
correlated. The negative correlation may arise due to the two omitted variables 
mentioned before, executive talent and the importance of firm-specific knowledge. 
Whenever an executive is perceived to be talented or firm-specific knowledge is more 
important, not only will the board offer a longer Duration pay ex ante, but will also be 
reluctant to fire such an executive.  Duration and forced executive turnover may also be 
negatively related due to poor firm-level corporate governance. To the extent the 
executive forfeits unvested pay when being forced out, boards (that act in the 
executive’s best interest) may be reluctant to fire an executive with long-duration pay. 
We perform tests to understand the validity of these three reasons. 
      We find that CEOs (and non-CEO executives) are less likely to experience an 
involuntary turnover if they have a longer Duration pay. The effect of Duration on 
involuntary turnover is also economically significant. A one standard deviation increase 
in Duration is associated with a 57.5% (60.3%) decrease in the likelihood of an 
involuntary CEO (senior executive) turnover. 
      To the extent executive talent is time invariant, we expect time-invariant executive-
specific factors to proxy for executive talent. To isolate the effect of CEO talent on the 
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relationship between pay duration and forced CEO turnover, we repeat our baseline 
estimation after including CEO fixed effects. We find that the inclusion of CEO fixed 
effects marginally reduces the size of the coefficient on Duration but significantly 
increases the standard errors and hence the coefficient becomes insignificant. This is 
consistent with time-invariant executive-level factors having an effect on the relation 
between Duration and forced CEO turnover (Graham et al. 2011). In additional tests 
looking at time-invariant executive factors, we find that an executive’s pay duration in 
prior employment (Prior duration) is negatively related to the likelihood of a forced 
turnover. This offers further support for the effect of time-invariant executive-level 
factors on the duration-forced turnover relationship.  
      To isolate the effect of the importance of firm-specific knowledge on the relationship 
between pay duration and forced executive turnover, we perform two sets of tests. First, 
we repeat our baseline estimation after including firm fixed effects. To the extent that 
the importance of firm-specific knowledge is time-invariant, firm fixed effects should 
capture it. Surprisingly, we find that inclusion of firm fixed effects does not significantly 
affect the size of the coefficient on Duration as compared to the OLS estimate, where we 
include industry fixed effects. This highlights that time-invariant firm-specific factors 
do not appear to have a significant effect on the relation between Duration and forced 
CEO turnover.  
      The importance of firm-specific knowledge could be time varying. In situations 
where firm-specific knowledge is important, firms are likely to offer longer Duration 
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pay for all the top executives of the firm. The average duration of the other senior 
executives in the firm in any year could therefore measure the importance of firm-
specific knowledge for that firm during that year. Consistent with the importance of 
firm-specific knowledge, we find that CEOs are less likely to experience forced turnover 
if the firm offers higher average duration pay to the other senior executives in the firm.5 
      To estimate the extent to which the negative association between pay duration and 
forced executive turnover is due to poor firm-level corporate governance, we repeat our 
tests after including an interaction term between Independent, a dummy variable that 
identifies firms with above-median fraction of independent directors in the board and 
Duration. We find that the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant. 
Thus, the negative relation between Duration and forced CEO turnover is stronger in the 
subsample of firms with more independent boards. This suggests that poor corporate 
governance is unlikely to account for the negative association between pay duration 
and forced turnover.  
      An interesting puzzle in the empirical corporate governance literature is the low 
sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance. That is, CEOs are not fired 
immediately on poor stock performance. Taylor (2010) uses a structural model to argue 
that the low correlation may be due to firms facing switching costs when they replace 
CEOs. To the extent that Duration captures these switching costs, one would expect 
executives with longer Duration to have a lower performance-turnover sensitivity. Our 
                                                          
5 The average duration of the other executives could proxy for factors other than the importance of firm-
specific knowledge. To this extent, we do not interpret this evidence as causal.  
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results support this conjecture. We find that the forced turnover of CEOs with above-
median Duration is not sensitive to stock return. On the other hand, for CEOs with 
below-median Duration, turnover is very sensitive to stock return.  
      In our final set of tests, we look at the choice between an insider versus an outside to 
replace the firm’s CEO. Consistent with longer pay duration indicating the importance 
of firm-specific knowledge, we find that firms that offer a longer-duration pay contract 
to their executives are more likely to recruit an insider to replace the CEO. Hiring CEOs 
from inside the firm, in turn, also help retain insiders and motivate them to invest in the 
acquisition of firm-specific knowledge.  
      Our paper makes a number of contributions to the empirical compensation 
literature. We are the first to use detailed information on vesting schedules to estimate 
the effect of deferred pay on executive turnover. Prior research that looks at the link 
between compensation and turnover relate the level of stock-based pay to managerial 
turnover (e.g., Balsam and Miharjo 2007; Fee and Hadlock 2003; Hasenhuttl and 
Harrison 2002; Mehran and Yermack 1997). In comparison, our duration measure, 
which accounts for both the level and the vesting period of stock-based pay, better 
captures the cost that managers incur when they leave the firm and reveals the firm’s 
retention intention. Our detailed vesting data also allow us to design sharper tests to 
estimate the causal effect of deferred pay on turnover. 
      Our paper also contributes to the literature that studies the performance-turnover 
sensitivity of CEOs. Prior literature shows that, in contrast to what economic theories 
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predict, the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to firm performance is rather modest 
(e.g., Coughlan and Schmidt 1985; Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1997; Huson, Parrino, and 
Starks 2001; Warner, Watts, and Wruck 1988; Weisbach 1988). We find that pay Duration 
has an important moderating role on the performance-turnover relationship. This 
suggests that the switching costs in replacing talented executives may go towards 
explaining the weak performance- turnover relationship.  
      The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops testable 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and variables used in the empirical tests. 
Section 4 presents our main analysis on pay duration and executive turnover. Section 5 
concludes. Definitions of other variables appear in Appendix B.  
2. Hypotheses Development 
      In this section, we outline the hypotheses that have predictions for our setting. Firms 
often defer pay to retain valuable talent. Deferring pay will also enable the firms to 
provide incentives for the executives to invest in firm-specific knowledge. Lately, the 
preferred mode for firms to defer pay is to award a large part of the executive’s annual 
compensation in the form of restricted stock and stock options and to get these awards 
to vest over a long period. The awards are structured such that the executive will forfeit 
the unvested portion of the grant if she leaves the firm. This increases the cost to the 
executive of leaving the firm. Any organization that wants to hire the executive has to 
compensate for the loss resulting from the forfeiture of unvested options and restricted 
stocks. This would predict that the amount and vesting schedule of option and stock 
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grants will affect the executive’s likelihood of voluntarily leaving the firm. To test this 
prediction, we employ the measure of pay duration developed in Gopalan et al. 
(forthcoming). The advantage of the duration measure is that it takes into account both 
the amount of unvested grants and their remaining vesting schedule. This leads to our 
first hypothesis.  
      Hypothesis 1: Managers with longer pay durations are less likely to leave the firm 
voluntarily.  
      To the extent that long pay duration indicates the importance of firm-specific 
knowledge or/and the perceived managerial talent, the boards of such firms may be 
more reluctant to fire such executives and choose to wait longer before reaching the 
firing decision even following poor firm performance. This would predict that 
executives with longer pay duration are less likely to be forced out. This forms our 
second hypothesis. 
      Hypothesis 2: Managers with longer pay duration are less likely to experience involuntary 
turnover.  
If, consistent with Hypothesis 2, boards are less likely to force out executives with longer 
pay duration, it could be due alternatively to poor corporate governance. That is, a 
captured board (that acts in the interest of executives instead of shareholders) may be 
reluctant to force out executives, who otherwise would have had to forfeit all unvested 
pay if being forced out. We examine these different explanations underlying Hypothesis 
2 in our empirical analysis later.    
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      An important puzzle in the corporate governance literature is the low explanatory 
power (in economic magnitude) of stock performance on forced CEO turnover. That is, 
CEOs are not significantly more likely to be fired following poor stock performance. 
Taylor (2010) uses a structural model to argue that the low turnover-performance 
correlation may be due to firms facing switching costs when they replace CEOs. One 
possible source of switching cost may be the loss of firm-specific knowledge from the 
departing CEO. That may explain why boards have greater forbearance in tolerating 
poor performance and wait longer before the turnover decision in some firms. To the 
extent that pay duration is longer in situations where firm-specific knowledge is more 
important (see Hypothesis 1), we expect the correlation between firm performance and 
forced CEO turnover to be especially low in the subsample of executives with long pay 
duration. This forms our next hypothesis.  
      Hypothesis 3: The sensitivity of forced turnover to firm performance should be lower for 
CEOs with longer pay duration. 
      To the extent that firms offer longer-pay duration in situations where firm-specific 
knowledge is more important, it has implications for the firm’s choice between an 
insider versus an outsider for the new CEO, conditional on CEO succession. To the 
extent that an insider has better firm-specific knowledge, we expect firms that on 
average offer longer-pay duration to be more likely to hire an internal candidate. Hiring 
CEOs from inside the firm, in turn, also motivate talented insiders’ investment in the 
13 
 
acquisition of firm-specific knowledge and help retain them. This leads to our final 
hypothesis:  
      Hypothesis 4: Firms that on average offer longer duration pay contracts to their executives 
are more likely to hire an internal candidate as a CEO.  
3. Data and Variables 
3.1. Data and sample 
We obtain the data for our analysis from six sources: Equilar Consultants, 
Execucomp, Riskmetrics, Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings (13f) database, the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), and Compustat. 
 We identify executive turnovers from ExecuComp and use news reports, 
Boardex and other public sources to classify the turnover as voluntary or 
involuntary.  
 Data on the vesting schedules of restricted stock and stock options are obtained 
from Equilar Consultants (hereafter, Equilar). Similar to S&P (provider of 
ExecuComp), Equilar collects compensation data from firms' proxy statements. 
We obtain details of all stock and option grants to all named executives covered 
by Equilar for the years 2006-2009. Equilar also provides the grant date and the 
present value of the grants as reported in the proxy statements. Equilar also 




 We obtain data on other components of executive pay, such as salary and bonus, 
from ExecuComp. We carefully hand-match Equilar and ExecuComp using firm 
tickers and executive names. Since prior studies on executive compensation 
predominantly use ExecuComp, we ensure comparability of Equilar and 
ExecuComp by making sure the total number of options granted during the year 
for each executive in our sample is the same across the two data sets.6 
 We obtain data on the composition of the Board of Directors from RiskMetrics 
and whenever needed, supplement it with data from Boardex. Our data on block 
holders is from Thomson Reuters Institutional Holdings (13f) database.  
 We complement the compensation and board data with stock returns from CRSP 
and firm accounting data from Compustat. 
Our final sample consists of the executives covered by both Equilar and ExecuComp 
for the time period 2006-2009. This results in 6,127 firm-years involving 1,803 firms, 
2,406 CEOs and 6,974 other senior executives. 
3.2. Key variables 
3.2.1. Pay duration 
      We follow Gopalan et al. (forthcoming) to construct our measure of pay duration 
(“Duration”). To construct this measure, we use data on annual stock and option grants. 
                                                          
6 We drop 2,470 executive-year observations for which we cannot match the number of option grants 





Specifically, it is the weighted average of the lengths of the vesting periods of the four 
pay components (i.e., salary, bonus, restricted stocks, and stock options), with the 
weight for each component being the fraction of that component in the executive’s total 
compensation. If the stocks and options are granted with a cliff vesting schedule, we 
calculate pay duration as: 
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where        and       are the dollar values of salary and bonus as of the year end. 
Since salary and bonus are paid out in full by the end of the year they have a vesting 
period of zero in the above formula.          and          are the dollar value of 
restricted stock grant si and stock option grant oi, which have a final vesting period of 
    and     years, respectively. The value of a restricted stock grant is estimated as the 
product of the stock price on the grant date and the number of stocks granted, while the 
value of a stock option grant is estimated using Black-Scholes option pricing model by 
Equilar. S and O, respectively, are the total number of stock and option grants to the 
executive in a year. If the stock and option grants vest equally over the vesting periods 
(graded vesting schedule),      (   ) is replaced with 
     
 
 (
     
 
).  
      Our baseline measure of pay duration does not include grants from prior years. To 
account for such grants, we construct an alternative measure (“Duration-2”) by 
expanding the estimation to include all unvested stock and option grants from prior 
years. Specifically, Duration-2 is calculated as: 
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where  ̂  is the sum of the number of stock grants during the year and the number of 
unvested stock grants from prior years. For an unvested stock grant si, tsi  is the 
remaining time to final vesting. Similarly,  ̂  is the sum of the number of option grants 
during the year and the number of unvested option grants from prior years, and for an 
unvested option grant oi, toi  is the remaining time to final vesting. As before, if the stock 
and option grants vest equally over the vesting periods (graded vesting schedule),      
(   ) is replaced with 
     
 
 (
     
 
). More details on the construction of Duration-2 are 
provided in Appendix A. 
      Our measure of duration does have a limitation as a proxy for the extent of deferred 
pay. We do not include severance and post-retirement benefits that may be important 
for providing long-term incentives. The main reason for this exclusion is the difficulty 
in obtaining the vesting schedules of these benefits. To the extent that the retirement 
benefits are in the form of a defined contribution retirement account and to the extent 
that the executive has spent sufficient time with the firm, the retirement account is 
likely to have vested fully and is unlikely to prove problematic. Furthermore, our 
subsequent empirical analysis shows that our measure of pay duration is significantly 
associated with the likelihood of voluntary turnover.  
3.2.2 Management turnover 
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      In this section, we describe the methodology we employ to identify turnover of a 
named executive of the firm for whom we can obtain pay data from the firm’s proxy 
statements. We start by identifying changes in executive designations as documented in 
ExecuComp. 7  We then search Factiva, LexisNexis, and Boardex for news reports 
coincident with the change in designation to identify the causes for the change. From 
our list of potential turnovers, we drop instances that are due to misclassification in 
ExecuComp, takeovers or spinoffs, interim positions, sudden death of the manager and 
mandatory or planned retirement. Our final sample includes 1081 management 
turnovers, of which 239 involve a CEO.  
      For turnovers involving a CEO, we start with using the criteria in Parrino (1997) to 
classify the turnover as voluntary or involuntary. All turnovers for which the press 
reports that the CEO is fired, is forced out, or departs due to difference of opinion or 
unspecified policy differences with the Board, are classified as forced. Of the remaining 
turnovers, if the departing CEO is under age 60, it is classified as forced if either (1) the 
reported reason for the departure does not involve death, poor health, or acceptance of 
another position elsewhere or within the firm (including the chairmanship of the 
board)8, or (2) the CEO is reported to be retiring but there is no announcement about the 
retirement made at least two months prior to the departure. We then complement these 
                                                          
7  The earlier literature identifies the samples of CEO turnovers using Forbes annual compensation 
surveys (e.g., Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani 1996; Huson, Malatesta, and Parrino 2004; Huson, 
Parrino, and Stark 2001; Parrino 1997). More recent studies (e.g., Jenter and Kanaan forthcoming) use the 
changes in the CEO position in ExecuComp to classify CEO turnovers.   
8 In case of health being a reported reason for the departure, we track backward the press reports about 
the CEO’s health status, and ensure that the departure is indeed due to the health problem. Otherwise, 
we still treat the departure as being forced.   
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criteria with two of our own. We reclassify a forced turnover (identified using the steps 
described above) as voluntary if either (1) the CEO’s employment record, obtained from 
Boardex and Marquis Who’s Who publications, suggests that the CEO obtained a 
comparable position elsewhere, or (2) the press reports convincingly explain that the 
departure is due to previously undisclosed personal or business reasons that are 
unrelated to the firm’s activities. All the CEO turnovers not classified as forced or due 
to mandatory or planned retirements are classified as voluntary.9  
      For some of our tests, we classify a new CEO as being external/internal to the firm if 
she has been with the firm for no more/more than a year before the succession. We do 
this by relying on ExecuComp and Boardex for information on a manager’s career path, 
supplemented by Marquis Who’s Who publications, Bloomberg Businessweek, and 
Standard & Poor’s register of corporations, directors, and executives.  
      For turnovers involving other senior executives, there are fewer detailed press 
reports about the circumstances involving their departure. Hence, it is difficult to 
employ the same criteria as those for CEOs to distinguish between forced and voluntary 
turnovers. We thus employ an alternative classification. We first try to identify if a 
departing executive takes up a position in a new firm. Specifically, we classify an 
executive turnover as “jump-ship” (employing the terminology in Fee and Hadlock 
(2003)) either if (1) the press reports that the executive is leaving to join another firm, or 
                                                          
9 Among CEOs who depart voluntarily in our sample, 27 join other firms as CEOs. Given the small 




(2) the employment record of the executive as obtained from Boardex and Marquis 
Who’s Who publications indicates that the executive took up a position in a new firm 
within three months of departure from the old firm and there is no convincing evidence 
in the press that the executive was ousted by the old firm. All other senior executive 
turnovers except those involving mandatory retirements are classified as involuntary.  
      Given the paucity of information about non-CEO executive turnovers, we are likely 
to classify some voluntary executive turnovers as involuntary. This is unlikely to be a 
problem for us because our primary interest is in understanding how pay duration 
affects the probability of a voluntary executive turnover. Moreover, Hypotheses 1 & 2 
predict that pay duration is negatively correlated with both voluntary and involuntary 
executive turnover. 
3.3. Summary statistics 
        Table 1 presents summary statistics of the key variables we use in our analysis. All 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to mitigate the potential impact of 
outliers. Detailed definitions of these variables (except pay duration and management 
turnover that are discussed earlier) are provided in Appendix B. Panel A summarizes 
the data for CEOs while Panel B summarizes the data for non-CEOs. From Panel A, we 
find that the average Duration (Duration-2) for CEOs in our sample is 1.45 (1.48) years, 
consistent with the numbers in Gopalan et al. (forthcoming). We find that the average 
CEO is 54.87 years old, has spent 7.48 years in her current position and has about 0.13% 
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of the firm’s equity. We also find that about 51% of the CEOs in our sample are also the 
Chairman of their board as seen from the mean value of Duality.  
      From Panel B, we find that the mean value of Duration (Duration-2) for non-CEOs in 
our sample is 1.26 (1.29) years. The non-CEOs have an average age of 50.39 years and 
have spent 14.84 years in the firm. Note that while Tenure for CEOs indicates the 
number of years the executive has been the CEO, for non-CEOs, Tenure refers to the 
number of years the executive has been with the firm.  
      In Panel C, we present the summary statistics of the characteristics of the firms in 
our sample. We use industry adjusted stock return (Ind. adj. stock return), which is the 
difference between the annual return on the firm’s stock and the average stock return of 
firms in the same industry defined at the two-digit SIC code level  as our main measure 
of firm performance. 10 We find that, on average, firms in our sample outperform the 
industry as seen from the mean value of Ind. adj. stock return of 0.03%. The average 
Volatility of the firms in our sample is 42%. The firms in our sample are on average 
large, as seen from the mean value of Firm size, of 7.75. In comparison, the average value 
for all firms in Compustat during the same sample period is 5.47. The firms in our 
sample have valuable growth opportunities as seen from the average value of Market to 
book ratio of 1.71. The average Leverage of our sample firms is 23%, and on average, they 
                                                          
10 Our main findings hold for alternative measures of firm performance, namely, two year industry 
adjusted stock returns, industry adjusted returns using Fama-French 49 industry classification and 
industry adjusted performance measure used by Jenter and Kanaan (forthcoming). The latter is estimated 
as the annualized residual obtained from regressing the monthly return on the firm’s stock on the return 
of the value weighted index of all firms in the same industry.  
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spend about 2.4% of the book value of total assets on R&D as seen from the mean value 
of R&D/Asset.  
      In Table 2, we conduct a set of univariate tests on the different turnovers in our 
sample. In Panel A, we classify the CEO years in our sample into those involving a 
voluntary turnover and those not involving a voluntary turnover, and provide the 
average CEO and firm characteristics. We have 125 voluntary CEO turnover events 
during our sample period. The average value of Duration of CEOs who voluntarily 
leave the firm is 1.07, significantly below the average value of Duration for CEOs who 
stay with the firm (1.46). We observe a similar pattern with Duration-2. This is consistent 
with Hypothesis 1. We also find that firm-years with a voluntary CEO turnover have 
lower industry adjusted stock return. CEOs who voluntarily leave their firm are 
younger, have shorter tenures and lower stock holding in their firm. In our regressions 
that explore the effect of Duration and Duration-2 on voluntary CEO turnover, we 
include these variables as controls to ensure that they do not bias our conclusions.  
      In Panel B, we classify the non-CEO executive years in our sample into those before 
a non-CEO executive jumps ship and others, and present the average executive and 
firm characteristics.11 We have 289 instances where a non-CEO executive leaves the firm 
for another firm. We find that the average value of Duration (Duration-2) of non-CEO 
executives who “jump-ship”, 0.41 (0.46), is significantly below the average value for 
non-CEO executives who stay with the firm, 1.21 (1.31). This again is consistent with 
                                                          
11 We focus on the year before the executive jumps ship because executive pay information is usually not 
available in the proxy statements if the executive leaves in the middle of a year. 
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Hypothesis 1. We also find that firm-years before a non-CEO executive “jumps-ship” 
have lower industry adjusted stock return. Non-CEO executives who voluntarily leave 
their firm are younger and non-surprisingly have shorter tenures with their firm.  
      In Panel C, we divide our sample into firm-years before a forced CEO turnover and 
other firm-years, and present the average CEO and firm characteristics. We have 114 
forced CEO turnover events during our sample period. We find that while the average 
Duration (Duration-2) of CEOs who are forced out of their firms is 0.87 (0.87), it is 
significantly below the average value for CEOs who stay with the firm, 1.47 (1.50). This 
is consistent with Hypothesis 2. We also find that firm-years with a forced CEO turnover 
have lower Ind. adj. stock return. CEOs who are forced to leave their firm are also 
younger, have shorter tenures and lower stock holding in their firm, and are less likely 
to be the Chairman of their Board. In our regressions exploring the effect of Duration on 
forced CEO turnover, we include these variables as controls to ensure that they do not 
bias our conclusions.  
      Finally, in Panel D, we compare non-CEO executive-years before those involving an 
involuntary turnover to all others. We have 553 non-CEO turnover events in our sample 
that we classify as involuntary. We find that while the average value of Duration 
(Duration-2) of non-CEO executives who involuntarily leave the firm is 0.79 (0.80), it is 
significantly below the average value for non-CEO executives who stay with the firm, 
1.21 (1.31). This again is consistent with Hypothesis 2. We also find that executive-years 
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with an involuntary turnover have lower Ind. adj. stock return. Non-CEO executives who 
involuntarily leave their firm are younger and have shorter tenures with their firm.  
      To summarize, our univariate evidence indicates that executives (both CEOs and 
non-CEOs) with longer pay duration are less likely to leave their firms. This evidence is 
consistent with both Hypotheses 1 & 2.  
4. Main Analysis of Pay Duration and Turnover 
      In this section, we conduct multivariate tests of the effect of pay duration on 
executive turnover. We first discuss the tests that study voluntary turnovers, which are 
followed by those that look at involuntary turnovers.  
4.1. Pay duration and voluntary turnover 
4.1.1. Baseline analysis 
      In Table 3, we test Hypothesis 1 by relating CEO pay Duration to the likelihood of 
voluntary turnover. Following prior literature (e.g., Hazarika, Karpoff, and Nahata 
2012; Jenter and Kanaan forthcoming), we first employ the Cox proportional hazard 
model (Cox 1972) to conduct our test: 12  
 ( | )     (     )    ( 
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      The dependent variable in the model is whether there is a voluntary CEO turnover 
at the time of a year. The hazard model accounts for both the occurrence and timing of 
                                                          




turnover and allows for the inclusion of time-varying co-variates. We allow baseline 
hazards to vary across industries to capture the difference in turnover patterns in 
different industries. Our key independent variable is Duration, and Hypothesis 1 predicts 
that it has a negative coefficient. We also include as controls a number of firm and CEO 
characteristics that prior literature has shown to affect the probability of CEO turnover. 
The firm characteristics we include are Ind. adj. stock return, Firm size, Volatility and Block 
holder. The last variable is a dummy variable that identifies the presence of a block 
holder with more than 5% shareholding in the firm. The set of CEO characteristics we 
include are Tenure, Age, Stock holding, and Duality. In all regressions, we also include 
year fixed effects, and the standard errors we estimate are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustered at the three-digit SIC code industry level.  
      The results from Column (1) of Table 3 show that the coefficient on Duration is 
negative and significant. This indicates that a CEO with longer pay duration is less 
likely to leave the firm voluntarily. From the coefficient on the control variables, we find 
that older CEOs and CEOs who have higher equity ownership in the firm are less likely 
to leave the firm voluntarily. In Column (2), we repeat our estimates employing a linear 
probability model. We do this for two reasons. First, employing the linear probability 
model helps us estimate the economic significance of our results more easily and in an 
intuitive manner. Second, with the linear probability model, we can control for firm 
fixed effects. The inclusion of firm fixed effects ensures that we control for all time-
invariant firm characteristics. We are unable to include firm fixed effects in the non-
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linear COX hazard model because of the incidental parameters problem (Neyman and 
Scott 1948). Our results in Column (2) are consistent with those in Column (1) and show 
that CEOs with longer duration pay are less likely to voluntarily leave their firm. Our 
findings are also economically significant. The negative coefficient on Duration in 
Column (2) implies that a one standard deviation increase in Duration (0.97) results in a 
decrease in the annual probability of a voluntary CEO turnover by 1.16%. In 
comparison, the unconditional probability of a voluntary CEO turnover any year in our 
sample is 2.0% with a standard deviation of 14.1%. Thus, a one standard deviation 
increase in Duration is associated with a 58% decrease in the likelihood of a voluntary 
CEO turnover as compared to the sample mean or a 8.2% decrease in the standard 
deviation of the voluntary CEO turnover probability.  
      In Columns (3)-(4), we estimate the effect of pay duration on the likelihood of a non-
CEO executive jumping ship. In Column (3), we employ the COX model with the 
dependent variable being the indicator of a senior executive jumping ship at the time of 
a year. Apart from the usual set of controls, we also control for incidences of CEO 
turnover during the previous two years (CEO Turnover) and for incidences when there 
is an external hire in replacing the departing CEO during the previous two years 
(External hire). We do this to ensure that executive turnovers, which may result from a 
change in the top management of the firm, do not affect the coefficient on Duration.   
      The result in Column (3) shows that the coefficient on Duration is negative and 
statistically significant. This highlights that a longer pay duration lowers the likelihood 
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of a senior executive jumping ship. We also find that senior executives of larger firms 
(positive coefficient on Firm size), those with shorter tenure (negative coefficient on 
Ln(Tenure)), and  younger executives (negative coefficient on Age) are more likely to 
jump ship. Also, the likelihood of an executive jumping ship does not appear to be 
associated with firm performance. Column (4) presents the result of the linear 
probability model with time and firm fixed effects. Here again, we find that the 
coefficient on Duration is negative and significant. Our estimates are also economically 
significant. The coefficient on Duration in Column (4) implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in Duration (0.88) is associated with a 2.4% reduction in the 
probability of an executive jumping ship. In comparison, the unconditional probability 
of an executive jumping ship in our sample is 1.6% with a standard deviation of 12.6%. 
Thus, our estimates are extremely significant.  
      In Table 4, we repeat our tests in Table 3 with our alternative measure of pay 
duration that includes all the unvested stock and option grants from prior years. In this 
sense, it is a more comprehensive measure of all outstanding deferred pay from stock 
and option grants. We find that the coefficient on Duration-2 is negative and significant 
in all the columns. The economic significance of the result is comparable to those in 
Table 3. The coefficient in Column (2) (Column (4)) implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in Duration-2 that is 0.86 years (0.80 years) is associated with a 1.29% 
(2.48%) reduction in the probability of a voluntary CEO turnover (non-CEO executive 
jumping ship). Thus, our results are robust to the alternative measure of pay duration.  
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4.1.2. Test of causality 
      The negative correlation between Duration (or Duration-2) and voluntary executive 
turnover, documented in Tables 3 and 4, may be subject to an omitted variable bias, and 
thus may not necessarily imply a causal effect of deferred pay on turnover. The 
important firm- and executive-level omitted variable that may affect both pay duration 
and the likelihood of executive turnover are the importance of firm-specific knowledge 
and perception of executive talent by the board, respectively. Specifically, as discussed 
earlier, firms where firm-specific knowledge is valuable may offer longer duration pay 
to incentivize executives’ investment in such knowledge. To the extent such firm-
specific knowledge is less valuable outside the firm, executives of such firms may have 
less valuable outside options and hence may stay longer with the firm. Similarly, all else 
equal, boards may grant longer duration pay to executives who they perceive to be 
more talented. Given the favorable internal perception, such executives may also find it 
optimal to remain with the firm. 
      We implement a two-stage instrumental variable regression to examine the causal 
effect of pay duration on voluntary turnover. Our strategy is to identify executive-years 
in which a large prior-year stock or option grant vests (Large vesting). We use these 
lumpy vesting episodes as instances that significantly reduce an executive’s pay 
duration, and estimate its effect on executive voluntary turnover. To circumvent the 
endogeneity of stock/option grant, we focus on grants that were awarded more than 
two years ago. To the extent that these grants were awarded in the distant past, their 
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vesting is unlikely to be correlated with time-varying firm- and executive-level omitted 
variables and executive voluntary turnover. Edmans, Fang and Lewellen (2014) use a 
similar instrument to study the effect of stock vesting schedules on managerial myopia 
as reflected in corporate investment decisions. 
      Our identifying assumption in this test is two-fold. First, we assume Large vesting 
will be correlated with Duration-2. This is mechanical because Duration-2 includes prior 
year grants in its calculation. Vesting of a large stock or option grant during a year is 
likely to reduce Duration-2. 13  The second identifying assumption is the exclusion 
restriction which assumes that Large vesting is correlated with voluntary turnover only 
to the extent it affects Duration-2. We believe this is reasonable because, a) Duration-2 
adequately captures the effect of Large vesting on the amount and length of deferred 
pay; b) since we focus on the vesting of grants that are more than two years old, the 
vesting is unlikely to be correlated with time-varying firm and executive specific 
factors.  
      We present the results of this two-stage IV regression in Table 5. Given the 
consistent effect of pay duration on voluntary turnover for CEOs and non-CEO 
executives, as shown in Tables 3 and 4, and the expected identical marginal impact of 
Large vesting on pay duration across these two groups of executives, we pool CEOs and 
non-CEOs in this regression. Moreover, IV regression only allows the linear probability 
                                                          
13 Note that vesting of a large grant will increase Duration-2 only if the firm does replenish the vested 
stock and options with an equal sized grant with a longer vesting schedule. In our data, we find that the 
correlation between Large vesting and Duration-2 is negative and significant. This is consistent with firms 
not replenishing a vested grant.  
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model to be employed here. In the first stage, we regress Duration-2 on Large vesting and 
the set of control variables in Table 4, where Large vesting is defined as a dummy that 
equals one if the largest stock/option grant in prior years vests and zero otherwise. 
Consistent with our conjecture, we find that Large vesting results in a decrease in 
Duration-2 and the effect is significant. We also find that Large vesting is a strong 
instrument as seen from the F-value for the first stage regression of 12.51.14  More 
interestingly, the results of the second stage regression show that the coefficient on 
Duration-2 remains negative and significant, consistent with the findings in Table 4. In 
Columns (3) and (4), we repeat the estimate after including firm fixed effects and again 
find that the coefficient on Duration-2 is negative and significant.  
      In comparing Column (4) to Column (2), we find that the coefficient on Duration-2 
drops to a sixth after inclusion of firm fixed effects. This highlights the importance of 
unobserved, firm-level, time-invariant factors for executive turnover. The second 
interesting fact is when we compare the coefficient on Duration-2 in Column (4) to those 
in Columns (2) and (4) of Table 4, we find that the coefficient in our IV specification is 
significantly larger than that in the OLS specification. Note that when we estimate with 
an OLS specification combining CEO and non-CEO voluntary turnover, we find that the 
coefficient on Duration-2 is -0.049 and statistically significant. The larger coefficient in 
the IV specification as compared to that in the OLS specification indicates that 
                                                          
14 Note that a F-value over 10 is typically considered the sign of a strong instrument (Cameron and 
Trivedi 2005).  
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unobserved omitted factors that affect both Duration-2 and voluntary turnover are likely 
to be biasing the coefficient downward.  
      A possible reason for the negative bias is the presence of other factors that may bond 
an executive to the firm and reduce the likelihood of voluntary turnover. In the 
presence of such factors, firms may find it optimal to reduce the risk imposed on the 
executive and award pay with short vesting schedule. One such bonding mechanism 
could be if the executive is also one of the promoters. Such executives are unlikely to 
leave the firm voluntarily and in response, firms may award a low duration pay. 
Similarly, older executives with significant firm-specific skill may also be less likely to 
leave the firm voluntarily. For such executives as well, firms may find no need to award 
pay with long vesting schedule, especially if the executive’s remaining time to 
retirement is short.  
      To summarize, consistent with Hypothesis 1, we find that the likelihood of a 
voluntary CEO turnover and that of a non-CEO executive jumping ship are lower when 
they have longer pay duration. And our further test suggests that the effect of pay 
duration on voluntary executive turnover is causal. 
4.2. Pay duration and forced turnover 
      In Table 6, we analyze the effect of CEO pay duration on the likelihood of a forced 
CEO turnover. To the extent that a longer pay duration identifies firms with higher 
costs of changing CEOs, Hypothesis 2 predicts that a CEO with longer pay duration is 
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less likely to experience a forced turnover. In Column (1), we present the results of 
estimating the Cox hazard model on forced CEO turnovers. Consistent with Hypothesis 
2, the negative and significant coefficient on Duration shows that CEOs with longer pay 
duration are less likely to be forced out. We also find that firms with lower industry 
adjusted stock returns (negative coefficient on Ind adj. stock return) and firms with more 
volatile stock (positive coefficient on Volatility) are more likely to experience a forced 
CEO turnover. Also, CEOs of larger firms (positive coefficient on Size), younger CEOs 
(negative coefficient on Age) and those with lower shareholding (negative coefficient on 
Shareholding) are more likely to be forced out.  
      In Column (2), we repeat our estimates with a linear probability model and find 
consistent results as in Column (1). Our estimates are economically significant. The 
coefficient on Duration in Column (2) indicates that a one standard deviation increase in 
CEO pay duration (0.97) is associated with a 1.07% reduction in the probability of a 
forced CEO turnover. In comparison, the average probability of a forced CEO turnover 
in our sample is 1.86%. Another way to put the economic significance of the effect of 
Duration in context is to compare its effect to that of firm performance. The coefficient 
on Ind adj. stock return in Column (2) implies that a one standard deviation increase in 
Ind adj. stock return (0.33) is associated with a 0.76% reduction in the annual probability 




      Although the effect of pay duration on forced turnover is not expected to be causal, 
there are three potential explanations, outlined in Section 2, that might account for a 
negative correlation between pay duration and forced turnover. These are managerial 
talent, the importance of firm-specific knowledge, and weak corporate governance. In 
the subsequent tests, we explore the importance of these explanations for the observed 
negative correlation. 
      Boards may grant a longer duration pay to more talented CEOs and may also be 
more reluctant to fire such CEOs. To the extent managerial talent is time invariant, we 
follow prior literature and use managerial fixed effect to proxy for managerial talent 
(Bertrand and Schoar 2003) and repeat our tests in Column (3). Thus, the specification in 
column (3) includes CEO fixed effects in addition to industry and time fixed effects. 
Comparing the coefficient in column (3) to that in column (2), we find that inclusion of 
executive fixed effect has a marginal effect on the size of the coefficient on Duration but 
significantly increases the standard errors which results in the coefficient turning 
insignificant. This provides evidence consistent with manager fixed effects being 
important for the Duration-forced turnover relationship. 
      One disadvantage of using manager fixed effects to account for executive talent is 
that one does not have an average point estimate of the effect of talent. To get such an 
estimate in alternate tests (results are untabulated, but available upon request), we 
identify a set of CEOs for whom we can obtain pay duration in their prior employment, 
Prior duration. To the extent executive talent is time invariant and to the extent it affects 
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pay duration, we expect talented executives to obtain longer duration pay in their prior 
employment as well. To the extent executive talent affects the duration-turnover 
relationship, we expect a negative correlation between Prior duration and the likelihood 
of forced turnover. Consistent with CEO talent being an important explanation for the 
negative pay-duration-forced-turnover correlation, we find that the coefficient on Prior 
duration is negative and statistically significant.  
      Second, in firms where managers’ firm-specific knowledge is more important, the 
board is likely to be more tolerant in its executive force-out decision in order to 
encourage executives’ investment in acquiring firm-specific knowledge. There are two 
possible ways to isolate the effect of the importance of firm-specific knowledge in 
driving the forced turnover-duration relationship. Similar to using manager fixed 
effects to estimate the role of talent, one can use firm fixed effects to proxy for the 
importance of firm-specific knowledge and estimate its effect on the coefficient on 
Duration. We do this in column (4) and find that inclusion of firm fixed effects does not 
significantly affect the size of the coefficient on Duration. Thus, the negative correlation 
between Duration and forced CEO turnover in Column (2) appears mainly due to 
within-firm changes in Duration and forced CEO turnover.  
      Note that the small effect of firm fixed effects on the duration-forced CEO turnover 
relationship does not necessarily imply that investment in firm-specific knowledge is 
not important for the duration-forced CEO turnover relationship. The need for 
investment in firm-specific knowledge could be time varying and firm fixed effects are 
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unlikely to capture this. To isolate the effect of time-varying importance of firm-specific 
knowledge on the duration-forced turnover relationship, in unreported tests, we 
estimate the effect of Average duration on the likelihood of a forced CEO turnover. 
Average duration is the mean pay duration of all other senior executives in the firm in a 
given year. When firms want executives to invest in firm-specific knowledge, they are 
likely to offer long duration pay to all the top executives. We find that the coefficient on 
Average duration is negative and significant.  This is consistent with the importance of 
firm-specific knowledge as an important channel that underlies the negative correlation 
between CEO pay duration and forced turnover. 15 
      Third, we examine if the negative pay-duration-forced-turnover correlation may 
result from poor corporate governance. This can happen if a captured board (that acts in 
the interest of the CEO) is reluctant to fire a CEO with significant unvested stock and 
option grants as the CEO may lose the unvested grants. To test this, we use the fraction 
of independent directors on the firm’s board as our proxy for board strength and 
corporate governance, and create a dummy variable, Independent, that takes a value one 
if the fraction of outsiders on a firm’s board of directors is above the sample median in a 
given year. We then repeat our tests after including an interaction term between 
Independent and Duration to see if the negative effect of pay duration on the likelihood of 
forced CEO turnover is concentrated in firms with less independent boards. This would 
                                                          
15 We have Prior Duration for only a small fraction of our executives. This limits our ability to compare 
the relative importance of firm-specific knowledge and executive talent in affecting the Duration-forced 
turnover relationship by including both Average duration and Prior duration in the same specification. 




imply a positive coefficient on the interaction term. We present the results in Table 7. In 
Column (1), we repeat the estimate from Column (1) of Table 6 (the Cox hazard model) 
which relates CEO pay duration to the likelihood of a forced turnover. In Column (2), 
we repeat this estimate after including Independent and an interaction term Duration X 
Independent. We find that the coefficient on the interaction term is negative and 
significant, which suggests that the correlation between pay duration and forced CEO 
turnover is stronger in firms with more independent boards. In the next two columns, 
we repeat the analysis with the linear probability model and find consistent results. 
This finding is inconsistent with poor corporate governance as an explanation for the 
negative duration-forced-turnover relation. Instead, combined with our findings about 
the other two explanations, it suggests that more independent boards are more likely to 
incorporate the considerations of CEO talent and the importance of firm-specific 
knowledge into their CEO force-out decisions.                   
      We also analyze the effect of pay duration on the likelihood of involuntary turnover 
for non-CEO senior executives. As mentioned before, due to the paucity of details on 
non-CEO turnovers from public sources, we classify non-CEO turnovers that do not 
involve the executive retirement or the executive jumping ship to another firm as being 
involuntary. Note that this classification is bound to be noisy, and this set of turnovers 
could also include some voluntary turnovers. This is not a serious problem for us 
qualitatively, because we expect Duration to lower the likelihood of both voluntary and 
involuntary turnovers according to Hypotheses 1 & 2. The caveat is with the precision of 
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the estimate of the pay duration sensitivity of non-CEO executives’ involuntary 
turnover. To this end, we choose to not tabulate the results of our analysis in this part 
(available upon request). The untabulated results strongly support Hypothesis 2. They 
show that non-CEO executives with longer pay duration are less likely to experience an 
involuntary turnover. Also, the estimates of the effect of pay duration are highly 
significant in economical magnitudes. The coefficient estimated from the linear 
probability model implies that a one standard deviation increase in Duration (0.88) is 
associated with a 1.85% decrease in the probability of an involuntary executive 
turnover. In comparison, the average probability of an involuntary executive turnover 
in our sample is 3.07%. 
      Overall, our findings are consistent with Hypothesis 2 that executives with longer pay 
duration are less likely to experience an involuntary turnover. And this negative 
duration-turnover association is not due to poor corporate governance, but can be 
explained by the importance of firm-specific knowledge and managerial talent, both of 
which are positively related to pay duration and negatively related to forced turnover.     
4.3. Pay duration and performance-sensitivity of forced turnover 
      To test Hypothesis 3, we estimate how pay duration affects the sensitivity of forced 
CEO turnover to firm performance in Table 8. In Column (1), we repeat the estimate 
from Column (1) of Table 6 which relates CEO pay duration to the likelihood of a forced 
turnover. In Column (2), we repeat the estimation of the Cox hazard model after 
including an interaction term Duration X Ind. adj. stock return. We find that the 
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coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant. This indicates that, for 
CEOs with longer duration pay, the likelihood of a forced turnover is less sensitive to 
stock returns. In Column (3), we repeat the estimates with a linear probability model 
and again find that the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant. In 
Column (4), we repeat our estimates with firm (in addition to time) fixed effects and 
obtain similar results.  
      Since our duration measure is a continuous variable, it is difficult to interpret the 
economic significance of the coefficient on the interaction term. To get a better sense of 
the economic significance, in Column (5), we repeat our estimation after replacing 
Duration with a dummy variable, High duration, that takes a value one for the CEOs 
whose pay duration is above the sample median for that year. The coefficient on Ind. 
adj. stock return is an estimate of the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to stock returns 
for a CEO with below the sample median pay duration, while the sum of the 
coefficients on Ind. adj. stock return and Duration X Ind. adj. stock return is an estimate of 
the sensitivity of forced CEO turnover to stock returns for a CEO with above the sample 
median pay duration. Our estimates show that the coefficient on Ind. adj. stock return is -
.038. This is twice the estimate in Column (3). It indicates that forced CEO turnover is 
twice as sensitive to stock returns for CEOs with below the sample median pay duration 
as compared to the sample average sensitivity. We also find that the coefficient on the 
interaction term is .034. And in unreported tests, we find that we cannot reject the null 
that the sum of the coefficients on Ind. adj. stock return and the interaction term Duration 
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X Ind. adj. stock return is equal to 0. This indicates that in our sample, forced CEO 
turnover is not sensitive to stock performance for CEOs with above the sample median 
pay duration. That is, all the sensitivity to stock returns found in Column (3) is driven 
by CEOs with below the sample median pay duration. 
       Our finding is consistent with perceived switching costs affecting the turnover-
performance sensitivity (Taylor (2010)). Specifically, higher perceived switching cost 
may explain the board’s greater forbearance in tolerating poor firm performance and 
waiting longer before firing the CEO. Possible sources of switching costs could be the 
loss of firm-specific knowledge and high perceived managerial talent. Our results of the 
lower performance-turnover sensitivity among CEOs with high duration pay is 
consistent with pay duration capturing both the importance of firm-specific knowledge 
and managerial talent.  
4.4. Pay duration and internal CEO hiring  
      In this section, we perform tests of Hypothesis 4 that has predictions on whether a 
firm will select an internal or external candidate as the replacement CEO. To the extent 
that the average duration of the top executives of a firm is a proxy for the importance of 
firm-specific knowledge in the firm, we expect firms that offer longer average pay 
duration to their top executives to be more likely to hire an internal candidate to replace 
the CEO. On the other hand, internal hiring is also an important means of talent 
retention because insiders would have stronger incentives in investing in acquiring 
firm-specific knowledge. In Table 9, we estimate a linear probability model where the 
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dependent variable is External, a dummy variable that identifies firms that select an 
external candidate as the replacement CEO. Our main independent variable is Average 
duration, the average pay duration of all senior executives (except the departing CEO) of 
the firm included in ExecuComp. We include as a control variable, Forced turnover, a 
dummy variable that identifies if the departing CEO was forced out. We include this 
variable because prior research shows that firms are more likely to hire an outsider if 
the predecessor was forced out (e.g., Parrino 1997). We also include Ind. adj. stock return, 
Volatility, Firm size, and Block holder as additional control variables.  
      The result in Column (1) of Table 9, estimated with industry and year fixed effects, 
shows that firms are less likely to hire an external candidate if the senior executives in 
the firm have longer pay duration. This finding is robust after including other control 
variables in the regression, as shown in Column (2). One concern with our estimates is 
that they could be biased by the quality of the internal candidate who is chosen to be 
the CEO. Firms that have a better quality internal candidate are likely to offer her a 
contract with longer pay duration and also select her to be the replacement CEO. To 
address this concern, we repeat our tests by calculating Average duration after excluding 
the pay duration of the internal candidate who becomes the replacement CEO. In 
untabulted results, we again find that firms that offer longer duration pay contracts to 
their senior executives are less likely to hire an external candidate.  
      To the extent that the importance of firm-specific knowledge is common across firms 
in an industry, we expect firms in industries with higher pay duration to be more likely 
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to hire an internal candidate to replace their CEO. We test this in Column (3) after 
replacing Average duration in Column (1) with Industry duration, which is defined as the 
average pay duration of CEOs in the industry (defined based on three-digit SIC 
codes).16 We find that firms from industries with higher average pay duration are more 
likely to hire an internal candidate, as seen from the negative and significant coefficient 
on Industry duration. In Column (4), the coefficient on Industry duration remains negative 
but becomes insignificant after including other control variables. The impact of Industry 
duration appears to be encapsulated by that of the variations of firm characteristics 
across industries.    
      As a summary, we document that firms are more likely to choose an insider as their 
new CEO if other senior executives have been granted pay with longer duration. It is 
consistent with the firm-specific knowledge being an important consideration in firms’ 
CEO succession decision.    
5. Conclusions 
      We argue that deferred pay enables firms to retain managerial talent. Firms typically 
defer the stock component of pay. The forfeiture of all unvested stock pay upon 
executive turnover, voluntarily or involuntarily, increases the cost of managerial 
departure. Using the duration measure of executive compensation, introduced by 
Gopalan, et al. (forthcoming), that captures both the magnitude and the vesting length 
of stock pay, we find that there is a negative causal effect of pay duration on voluntary 
                                                          
16 In this test, only year fixed effect is included.  
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executive turnover. We also find that pay duration is negatively correlated with 
involuntary executive turnover, the sensitivity of involuntary turnover to firm 
performance, and the likelihood of external hiring in CEO succession. These findings 
are consistent with a significant role of the importance of firm-specific knowledge and 
managerial talent that underlie both the design of pay duration and executive turnover 
decisions in firms.       
        Our study suggests that firms’ compensation policy and management turnover 
decisions are interlinked. It highlights the effectiveness of explicit compensation 
contract in talent retention, which has received little attention in the prior literature on 
managerial compensation. We leave it for future research to explore potentially 
interesting implications of the joint roles of managerial compensation contract – 
incentive provision and talent retention – on firms’ financial policies and corporate 
decisions.   
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Appendix A: Construction of the alternative duration measure – Duration-2 
      Duration-2 augments the baseline duration measure Duration by including all grants 
awarded in prior years. Among them, all vested stocks and stock options awarded in 
prior years are assigned a vest period of 0; detailed vesting schedule of all unvested 
grants that were awarded during 2006-2009 is obtained from Equilar; for all unvested 
grants that were awarded prior to 2006, we need to estimate their vesting schedule 
using the detailed information provided in ExecuComp on the total outstanding 
unvested stocks and stock options as of each year end. The procedure of estimating the 
vesting schedule of unvested pre-2006 grants is described as follows. 
      For stock options, we first isolate the unvested pre-2006 grants by subtracting the 
unvested post-2006 grants (aggregated from Equilar) from the total outstanding 
unvested grants obtained from ExecuComp. To do so, we need to merge Equlilar and 
ExecuComp using executive identity, year, exercise price, and expiration date. We then 
use the year-on-year change in the total unvested pre-2006 grants to gauge their vesting 
schedule with the assumption that these grants vest at the end of 2011. For restricted 
stocks, we do not need such an assumption since there is no expiration date or exercise 
price for restricted stocks. And we follow the same procedure in the estimation of their 
vesting schedule except that we merge Equilar and ExecuComp using executive 




Appendix B: Definitions of other variables  
 
Age  Age of the executive (in years)    
 
Block holder Indicator variable: Takes a value of one if there is at least one 
institution holding more than 5% of the firm’s outstanding stocks.  
 
Duality Indicator variable: Takes a value of one if the CEO is also the 
chairperson, and 0 otherwise. 
 
External hire Indicator variable: Takes a value of one if an outsider hired is 
hired as a CEO. 
 
Firm size Natural log of the total assets of the firm.  
 
High duration Indicator variable: Takes a value of one if the pay duration of the 
executive is above the sample median. 
 
Ind adj. stock 
return 
Firm’s annual stock return from the previous year net of the mean 
industry stock return.  
 
Independent Indicator variable: Takes a value of one if the fraction of outsiders 
on the firm's Board of Directors is above the median in a given 
year. Any director who is an employee of the firm or has some 
affiliation with the firm is classified as an insider. 
 
Leverage It is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities 
divided by total assets.  
 
Market to book The ratio of market value of total assets to book value of total 
assets 
 
R&D/Asset It is the ratio of research and development expenditure over the 
book value of total assets. Missing values are replaced with zero.  
 
Stock holding  The fraction of outstanding shares owned by the executive. 
 
Tenure Number of years an executive has been in office. 
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Table 1  
Summary Statistics 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics of our sample. Panels A and B present characteristics of CEOs 
and other executives, respectively. Panel C presents firm characteristics. Duration and Duration-2 are 
measures of executive pay duration discussed in Section 3.2. All other variables are defined in Appendix 
B.  
  
PANEL A: CEOs 
 
 
N Mean SD P25 Median P75 
Duration 6127 1.455 0.969 0.637 1.658 2.134 
Duration-2 6100 1.487 0.858 0.947 1.624 2.040 
Age 6127 54.865 7.194 50 55 60 
Tenure 6127 7.481 7.096 2.499 5.419 10 
Stock holding 6127 12.724 23.884 0.71 2.911 10.381 
Duality 6127 0.514 0.5 0 1 1 
 
 
PANEL B: Other executives 
 
 
N Mean SD P25 Median P75 
Duration 18005 1.259 0.882 0.491 1.377 1.891 
Duration-2 17979 1.291 0.804 0.722 1.397 1.826 
Age 18005 51.101 7.358 46 51 56 
Tenure 18005 14.873 11.707 6 12 22 





Panel C: Firm characteristics 
 
N Mean SD P25 Median P75 
Ind adj. stock return 6127 0.03 0.328 -0.172 -0.003 0.184 
Volatility 6127 0.42 0.228 0.26 0.361 0.509 
Firm size 6127 7.745 1.747 6.489 7.622 8.894 
Market to book 6108 1.706 0.99 1.073 1.367 1.967 
Leverage 6104 0.226 0.196 0.058 0.197 0.341 



















Univariate Evidence on Pay Duration and Turnover 
This table presents univariate evidence on pay duration and turnover. Panels A through D pertain to 
subsamples of voluntary CEO turnover, senior executives jump-ships, forced CEO turnover, and 
involuntary executive turnovers, respectively. Duration and Duration-2 are measures of executive pay 
duration discussed in Section 3.2. All other variables are defined in Appendix B. In each panel, the 
sample is further segmented into two groups of turnover vs non-turnover years. T-test is conducted on 
the difference between the two groups, which is reported in the last column. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 







N Mean N Mean Difference 
Duration 125 1.066 6002 1.463 -0.397*** 
Duration-2 124 1.077 5976 1.496 -0.419*** 
Ind adj. stock return 125 -0.044 6002 0.031 -0.075** 
Age 125 52.744 6002 54.909 -2.165*** 
Tenure 125 6.661 6002 7.499 -0.838 
Stock holding 125 6.661 6002 12.851 -6.19*** 
Duality 125 0.464 6002 0.515 -0.051 
 








N Mean N Mean Difference 
Duration 289 0.413 17716 1.273 -0.86*** 
Duration-2 289 0.461 17690 1.310 -0.844*** 
Ind adj. stock return 289 -0.009 17716 0.041 -0.05** 
Age 289 49.197 17716 51.132 -1.935*** 















N Mean N Mean Difference 
Duration 114 0.869 6013 1.466 -0.597*** 
Duration-2 113 0.869 5987 1.499 -0.630*** 
Ind adj. stock return 114 -0.18 6013 0.034 -0.214*** 
Age 114 51.579 6013 54.927 -3.348*** 
Tenure 114 5.001 6013 7.528 -2.527*** 
Stock holding 114 6.614 6013 12.84 -6.226*** 
Duality 114 0.307 6013 0.518 -0.211*** 
 







N Mean N Mean Difference 
Duration 553 0.794 17452 1.274 -0.48*** 
Duration-2 552 0.802 17427 1.307 -0.505*** 
Ind adj. stock return 553 -0.142 17452 0.046 -0.188*** 
Age 553 48.915 17452 51.17 -2.255*** 











Pay Duration and Voluntary Turnover  
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from Cox proportional hazard model and linear probability 
model that examine the likelihood of voluntary executive turnovers. Time-to-turnover is right censored. 
Duration is the baseline measure of executive pay duration discussed in Section 3.2. Other explanatory 
variables are defined in Appendix B. Robust standard errors are clustered by three-digit SIC industry and 
are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Cox OLS Cox OLS 
Duration -0.604*** -0.012*** -1.518*** -0.027*** 
 (0.118) (0.004) (0.121) (0.003) 
Ind adj. stock return -0.429 -0.011 0.083 0.002 
 (0.283) (0.007) (0.137) (0.003) 
Volatility -0.307 -0.012 -0.493 -0.016 
 (0.780) (0.022) (0.455) (0.010) 
Firm size -0.017 -0.010 0.187*** 0.002 
 (0.065) (0.012) (0.054) (0.006) 
Block holder -0.121 0.002 -0.237 0.007 
 (0.206) (0.011) (0.177) (0.005) 
Ln(Tenure) -0.093 0.037*** -0.185*** -0.002 
 (0.158) (0.008) (0.063) (0.002) 
Age -0.034** -0.001 -0.028*** -0.000** 
 (0.013) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) 
Stock holding -0.023*** -0.000   
 (0.008) (0.000)   
Duality 0.303 0.008   
 (0.249) (0.014)   
CEO turnover   0.254 0.005 
   (0.216) (0.006) 
External hire   -0.110 -0.011 
   (0.371) (0.011) 
Constant  0.125  0.048 
  (0.106)  (0.047) 
Observations 6113 6127 17986 18005 
Adjusted R2  -0.015  0.053 
Pseudo R2 0.060  0.174  













Pay Duration and Voluntary Turnover – Alternate Duration Measure  
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from Cox proportional hazard model and linear probability 
model that examine the likelihood of voluntary executive turnovers. Time-to-turnover is right censored. 
Duration-2 is the alternative measure of executive pay duration discussed in Section 3.2. Other 
explanatory variables are defined in Appendix B. Robust standard errors are clustered by three-digit SIC 
industry and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. 
 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Cox OLS Cox OLS 
Duration-2 -0.841*** -0.015*** -1.670*** -0.031*** 
 (0.152) (0.005) (0.119) (0.003) 
Ind adj. stock return -0.444 -0.012 0.131 0.002 
 (0.286) (0.007) (0.135) (0.003) 
Volatility -0.555 -0.012 -0.522 -0.015 
 (0.823) (0.022) (0.447) (0.010) 
Firm size -0.006 -0.010 0.199*** 0.002 
 (0.061) (0.012) (0.053) (0.006) 
Block holder -0.112 0.002 -0.203 0.008* 
 (0.204) (0.011) (0.183) (0.005) 
Ln(Tenure) -0.102 0.037*** -0.168*** -0.002 
 (0.153) (0.008) (0.063) (0.002) 
Age -0.035** -0.001 -0.026*** -0.000** 
 (0.014) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000) 
Stock holding -0.024*** -0.000   
 (0.008) (0.000)   
Duality 0.326 0.008   
 (0.252) (0.014)   
CEO turnover   0.240 0.005 
   (0.225) (0.006) 
External hire   -0.156 -0.010 
   (0.417) (0.012) 
Constant  0.128  0.056 
  (0.108)  (0.047) 
Observations 6086 6100 17960 17979 
Adjusted R2  -0.016  0.056 
Pseudo R2 0.072  0.185  












Pay Duration and voluntary turnover – IV estimation  
 
This table presents the results of a two-stage instrument variable regression that regress voluntary 
turnover of CEOs and non-CEO executives on instrumented Duration-2. In the first stage regression, 
Duration-2 is regressed on Large vesting, an indicator variable that takes a value of one if the largest stock 
and option grants from prior years (at least two years prior) vest, and other explanatory variables. 
Duration-2 is the alternative measure of executive pay duration discussed in Section 3.2. Other 
explanatory variables are defined in Appendix B. Robust standard errors are clustered by firm and are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
 Voluntary turnover (CEOs and non-CEOs combined) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 1 Stage 2 
Large vesting -0.025***  -0.162***  
 (0.013)  (0.011)  
Duration-2  -1.336*  -0.219*** 
  (0.686) 
 
 (0.021) 
Ind adj. stock return 0.124*** 0.160* -0.022 -0.006 
 (0.015) (0.088) (0.015) (0.004) 
Volatility -0.567*** -0.755* -0.123*** -0.043*** 
 (0.039) (0.393) (0.042) (0.012) 
Firm size 0.162*** 0.216* -0.014 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.111) (0.023) (0.006) 
Block holder 0.159*** 0.205* 0.035 0.014** 
 (0.014) (0.110) (0.022) (0.006) 
Ln(Tenure) -0.047*** -0.067** -0.069*** -0.016*** 
 (0.005) (0.033) (0.005) (0.002) 
Age -0.007*** -0.009** -0.003*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constant 0.674*** 0.949** 1.871*** 0.439*** 
 (0.053) (0.470) (0.178) (0.064) 
Observations 24079 24079 
9.51 
Time & Firm 
F-statistic 12.51 




Pay Duration and forced CEO turnover  
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from Cox proportional hazard model and linear probability 
model that examine the likelihood of forced CEO turnover. Time-to-turnover is right censored. Duration 
is the baseline measure of executive pay duration discussed in Section 3.2. Other explanatory variables 
are defined in Appendix B.  Robust standard errors are clustered by three-digit SIC industry and are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
  
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Cox OLS OLS OLS 
Duration -0.662*** -0.011*** -0.010 -0.012** 
 (0.132) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
Ind adj. stock return -1.251*** -0.023*** -0.010 -0.014* 
 (0.417) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Volatility 1.960** 0.053*** 0.055* 0.049* 
 (0.773) (0.018) (0.033) (0.026) 
Firm size 0.191*** 0.004*** -0.022** -0.003 
 (0.067) (0.001) (0.010) (0.010) 
Block holder 0.299 0.003 -0.003 0.004 
 (0.264) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ln(Tenure) -0.064 0.003 -0.017 0.054*** 
 (0.168) (0.003) (0.015) (0.011) 
Age -0.047*** -0.001*** 0.010** -0.004** 
 (0.017) (0.000) (0.005) (0.002) 
Stock holding -0.016** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Duality -0.184 -0.005 -0.014 -0.020 
 (0.255) (0.004) (0.010) (0.013) 
Constant  0.044* -0.328 0.163 
  (0.025) (0.268) (0.121) 
Observations 6113 6127 6127 6127 
Adjusted R2  0.030 0.355 -0.002 
Pseudo R2 0.118    

















Pay Duration and Forced CEO Turnover: Variation with Corporate 
Governance  
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from Cox proportional hazard model and linear probability 
model that examine the likelihood of forced CEO turnover. Time-to-turnover is right censored. Duration 
is the baseline measure of executive pay duration discussed in Section 3.2. Independent is an indicator 
variable that takes a value of one if the fraction of outsiders on the firm’s board of directors is above the 
sample median in a given year. Other explanatory variables are defined in Appendix B. Robust standard 
errors are clustered by three-digit SIC industry and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 COX Linear probability model 
Duration -0.662*** -0.351* -0.011*** -0.005 
 (0.132) (0.201) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ind adj. stock return -1.251*** -1.299*** -0.023*** -0.022*** 
 (0.417) (0.496) (0.006) (0.006) 
Independent  -0.034  0.007 
  (0.228)  (0.004) 
Independent X Duration  -0.655***  -0.017*** 
  (0.250)  (0.005) 
Volatility 1.960** 1.714* 0.053*** 0.041** 
 (0.773) (1.015) (0.018) (0.019) 
Firm size 0.191*** 0.204** 0.004*** 0.004** 
 (0.067) (0.084) (0.001) (0.002) 
Block holder 0.299 0.410 0.003 0.006 
 (0.264) (0.340) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ln(Tenure) -0.064 0.056 0.003 0.005 
 (0.168) (0.170) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age -0.047*** -0.054*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock holding -0.016** -0.010 -0.000** -0.000 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
Duality -0.184 -0.185 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.255) (0.261) (0.004) (0.005) 
Constant   0.044* 0.031 
   (0.025) (0.028) 
Observations 6113 5304 6127 5316 
Adjusted R2   0.030 0.029 
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.121   















Pay Duration and the Sensitivity of Forced CEO Turnover to Firm 
Performance  
 
This table presents coefficient estimates from Cox proportional hazard model and linear probability 
model that examine the likelihood of forced CEO turnover. Time-to-turnover is right censored. Duration 
is the baseline measure of executive pay duration discussed in Section 3.2. High duration is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if Duration is above the sample median in a given year. Other 
explanatory variables are defined in Appendix B. Robust standard errors are clustered by three-digit SIC 
industry and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 COX Linear probability model 
Duration -0.662*** -0.574*** -0.011*** -0.012**  
 (0.132) (0.130) (0.003) (0.005)  
Ind adj. stock return -1.251*** -0.977** -0.019*** -0.013 -0.038*** 
 (0.417) (0.397) (0.005) (0.008) (0.011) 
Duration X Ind. adj. return  0.571** 0.025*** 0.018*  
  (0.263) (0.007) (0.010)  
High duration     -0.019*** 
     (0.005) 
High duration X Ind. adj. stock 
return 
    0.034*** 
     (0.013) 
Volatility 1.960** 1.888** 0.050*** 0.050* 0.053*** 
 (0.773) (0.771) (0.018) (0.026) (0.018) 
Firm size 0.191*** 0.192*** 0.004*** -0.003 0.003*** 
 (0.067) (0.068) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) 
Block holder 0.299 0.321 0.003 0.005 0.002 
 (0.264) (0.269) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Ln(Tenure) -0.064 -0.069 0.003 0.053*** 0.003 
 (0.168) (0.172) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) 
Age -0.047*** -0.046*** -0.001*** -0.004** -0.001*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Stock holding -0.016** -0.016* -0.000** -0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Duality -0.184 -0.188 -0.005 -0.020 -0.006 
 (0.255) (0.256) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) 
Constant   0.041 0.158 0.037 
   (0.025) (0.124) (0.025) 
Observations 6113 6113 6127 6127 6127 
Adjusted R2   0.033 -0.000 0.029 
Pseudo R2 0.118 0.121    











Effect of Pay Duration of Other Senior Executives on CEO Succession 
Decision 
 
This table presents the results of a linear probability model that examine the likelihood of outside CEO 
succession following CEO turnover. The dependent variable takes a value of one if the newly appointed 
CEO has been with the firm for less than a year prior to the appointment and zero otherwise. Average 
duration is the average pay duration of other top executives than the departing CEO in the firm included 
in ExecuComp.  Industry avg. duration is the average pay duration of CEOs from the same industry. Other 
explanatory variables are defined in Appendix B. Robust standard errors are clustered by clustered by 
three-digit SIC industry and are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. 
      
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
 Probability of an external hire 
Average. duration -0.12*** -0.08*   
 (0.04) (0.04)   
Industry avg. duration   -0.10* -0.05 
   (0.06) (0.06) 
Ind adj. stock return  -0.11  -0.16** 
  (0.10)  (0.07) 
Volatility  0.16  0.12 
  (0.40)  (0.20) 
Firm size  -0.03  -0.05*** 
  (0.03)  (0.01) 
Block holder  -0.15*  -0.11* 
  (0.08)  (0.06) 
Constant 0.55*** 0.81** 0.57*** 0.90*** 
 (0.06) (0.34) (0.08) (0.20) 
Observations 429 429 437 437 
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.05 
Fixed effect Time and Industry Time 
 
